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reporting  had  any  future.  Research  with  a  positivist  epistemology  was
represented  by  the  contributions  from  Kurt  Auer  of  the  University  of
Innsbruck  with  an  empirical  analysis  of  the  value  relevance  of  earnings
￿ gures based on international, EU and Swiss accounting standards and from
the University of Amsterdam, Henk Langendijk and Bart van Praag with a
comparative study of income smoothing in Europe. A rewarding exchange of
ideas  and  comments  followed  these  presentations,  both  during  the  formal
meeting and the relaxed atmosphere of the buffet lunch that followed.
Once again the topics of discussion after these papers highlighted some of
the  fundamental  polarity  surrounding  the  ‘accounting’  phenomenon.  Is
accounting,  as  Herbert  Biener  suggested,  for  the  bene￿ t  of  the  whole
community, or, as other participants at the conference insisted, for the bene￿ t
of shareholders? Is ‘accounting’ a form of communication or measurement?
If it is the former can we meaningfully speak of an international accounting
standard, like the metric system, as one participant suggested?  If it is the
latter, then why should we be concerned with the subjective individual needs
of shareholders or the community? Such are the real alternatives still facing
the future of research and practice in ￿ nancial reporting.
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‘EDEN  calls to  everyone’s  mind  the  garden  of  delights  to  which  the  Book  of
Genesis refers. It evokes the attractive and creative environment that EIASM offers
to young promising scholars who undertake the exciting doctoral adventure.’
Although  the  EIASMs  Doctoral  Education  Network  already  exists  since
1988,  it  was  the  ￿ rst  time  that  an  EDEN-seminar  was  organized  in
accounting. It was devoted to ‘Analytical Accounting Research’ and held at
the headquarters of the EIASM in Brussels, Belgium, on 8-12 October 1996.
Twelve  PhD  students  from  various  European  countries  participated.  The
faculty included the following members: Professor John Christensen, Odense
University,  Denmark;  Professor  Gerald  A.  Feltham,  University  of  British
Columbia, Vancouver, Canada; Professor Alfred Wagenhofer, University of
Graz, Austria. Each faculty member lectured during one day and a half. Their
objective was to explore analytical models with which to study accounting
problems.  During the  last few years, analytical  models have  been  used  to
analyse a variety of problems within ￿ nancial and managerial accounting as
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below, was discussed:
c John Christensen: Cost function characteristics and accounting systems;
Performance  evaluation,  cost  variances,  and  controllability;  Budgets,
budgeting  and participation;
c Alfred  Wagenhofer:  Cost  allocation  and  transfer  pricing;  Accounting
principles  and  accounting  method  choice;  Disclosure  of  proprietary
information;
c Gerald A. Feltham: Impact of public and private information on welfare
of  investors,  prices  and  trading  volume,  and  management  incentives;
Accounting data and market value; Auditing.
The ￿ rst session of John Christensen dealt with ‘Cost function characteristics
and accounting systems’. The session was organized around the discussion of
a  couple  of  papers  on  ‘modern  costing’.  ‘Modern  costing’  has  created  a
renewal of interest in product costing and cost management. It emphasizes
the importance of aggregation, cost drivers, and cost allocation, ￿ ne-tuned to
the production  environment, in developing  useful measures of product cost
and value added. However, in the existing literature, there are only  a very
few references made to classical, basic economics. It seems that the exclusive
focus of ‘modern costing’ on the professional side has passed over the rich
heritage of the classical model. This led to the development of a paper by
Christensen  and  Demski,  entitled  ‘The  classical  foundation  of  ‘modern
costing’’, in which it is questioned how consistent this modern approach to
costing  is  with  the  neoclassical  theory  of  the  ￿ rm.  Although  there  are
similarities (identi￿ cation of cost pools, appropriate drivers, . . .), the starting
point is different. Classical literature starts from the complete speci￿ cation of
the  technology  and moves  to  the  cost function,  whereas ‘modern  costing’
starts from a simpli￿ ed cost function.
The  central  feature  additive  separability  of  the  cost  function  was  also
identi￿ ed by Noreen (1991). In his paper, Noreen developed three necessary
and suf￿ cient conditions under which Activity-Based Cost systems provide
relevant costs for decision making. 
The  session  continued  with  a  brief discussion  of a paper  by  Datar and
Gupta (1994), out of which appeared that even though you re￿ ne your cost
system,  you  may be worse off. In other  words, Datar & Gupta attack the
literature on its grounds by showing with numeric examples that a new cost
statistic is not necessarily a better one. It may even lead you further away
from the ‘true cost’.
The  product  costing  session  was  concluded  with  a  discussion  of  an
empirical paper by Foster and Gupta (1990) in which hypotheses were tested
about  volume-based,  complexity-based  and  ef￿ ciency-based  drivers  of
manufacturing  overhead costs.  Their results,  based  on  cross-sectional  data
from  a  questionnaire  of  various  facilities  of  an  electronics  company,
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variables and manufacturing overhead levels across facilities. However, after
controlling  for scale differences, no  strong  association  was found  between
complexity or ef￿ ciency variables and manufacturing overhead levels. John
Christensen pointed out that these results may seriously be biased by the fact
that all facilities differ from each other which may cause the effect washing
itself out, given the research design.
On Tuesday afternoon, John Christensen started with his second  session
dealing with performance evaluation, cost variances, and controllability. The
focus was put on agency models which provide a convenient structure for the
study of control problems in organizations. It was made clear that in order to
create and study a control problem, you must make sure that there is ￿ rst of
all a con￿ ict of interest. Second, you need to have some uncertainty. Third,
you need risk aversion. The discussion went on with a review of a paper by
Holmstr¨ om (1979),  entitled  ‘Moral hazards  and  observability’. Holmstr¨ om
derives  a  necessary  and  suf￿ cient  condition  for  imperfect  information  to
improve on contracts based on the payoff alone, and gives a characterization
of  the  optimal  use  of  such  information.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that
Holmstr¨ om’s work  is  based  on  Mirrlees’ work  about  tax  incentives  under
asymmetric information. Just on the day we were discussing  his work, the
1996 Nobel prize for economics was jointly awarded to James A. Mirrlees
and  William  Vickrey.  The  pair  were  honoured  for  their  fundamental
contribution  to  the  economic  theory  of  incentives  under  asymmetric
information. The complicated and dif￿ cult work of Mirrlees was transported
by Holmstr¨ om to management incentives under asymmetric information. The
seminar faculty concluded: ‘As you can see although it is not readable, this
does not mean that it is not useful. . .’
After having considered the role of imperfect information in a principal-
agent relationship subject to moral hazard, the discussion went on with the
embedding of the managerial evaluation problem in a principal-agent setting.
Antle  and  Demski  (1988)  tackled  this  problem  in  their  paper  ‘The
controllability  principle in  responsibility  accounting’ and question  whether
the optimal agency solution bears any logical relation to a casual de￿ nition of
controllability. The afternoon session was concluded with a brief review of a
paper of Dye (1986) dealing with optimal monitoring policies in agencies. It
is  shown  that  in  a  variety  of  contexts  optimal  monitoring  policies  are
deterministic and ‘lower-tailed’. Dye attempted to come up with conditions
that must be satis￿ ed in order to make a further investigation of the agent’s
actions optimal. John Christensen pointed out that this appears to be a very
dif￿ cult task.
To conclude, John Christensen stressed that it appears that strict conditions
are needed on the distribution functions and the likelihood of outcome, given
different  actions  to  get  intuitive  results.  In  order  to  apply  some  of  the
theoretical insights  that  were gained  during  the  day,  the  participants  were
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performance evaluation and evaluation based on controllable performance.
Wednesday  morning  began  with  a  discussion  of  the  exercises.  John
Christensen then went on with his last formal session on budgets, budgeting,
and participation. The ￿ rst paper reviewed was written by Christensen (1981)
and deals with communication in agencies. This paper is often cited in the
literature as it is  an  important sequence  of Holmstr¨ om’s paper on  optimal
contracting. Christensen has extended the usual agency model by including a
communication  structure. The discussion  continued  with  considering  more
profoundly  the  cost  of  having  communication.  Therefore,  reference  was
made to a paper of Demski and Sappington (1993), entitled ‘Sourcing with
unveri￿ able  performance  information’.  This  paper  shows  that  information
may be used perversely in  one part of a control problem in order to help
resolve frictions in other parts of the same problem.
The morning session was concluded with a review of a paper on capital
budgeting by Antle and Eppen (1985) in which three stylized facts about capital
budgeting  are  brought  into  relationship  with  the  presence  of  asymmetric
information. The three stylized facts were: the existence of organizational slack,
rationing of resources and the fact that the cut-off rate for accepting capital
projects in ￿ rms is often greater than the market rate of interest.
In the afternoon, Alfred Wagenhofer took over the chair of the seminar. The
￿ rst formal session dealt with cost allocation and transfer pricing. It was pointed
out that in order to create an interesting incentive problem, three ingredients are
needed (similar to the control problem): uncertainty, some degree of informa-
tion asymmetry and a con￿ ict of interest. This, combined with the fact that
managers have to make price and effort decisions,  makes the link with the
agency model obvious. To introduce the problem a paper of Balachandran and
Magee (1987) was presented, since the paper gives some basic notions on cost
allocation  procedures  that  lead  to  both  short-term  (usage)  and  long-term
(capacity) ef￿ ciency, which is good for understanding the intuition behind the
problem. Wagenhofer pointed out the problem of collusion which may arise
when players would discuss the fairness of cost allocation with each other and
thereby might reveal their private information.
The discussion then went on with the linkage of the cost allocation rule to
the strategic position of the ￿ rm vis-` a-vis its competitor. Indeed, a key issue
in transfer pricing is the strategic playing by the manager and others trying to
in￿ uence it. Therefore, reference was made to a paper of Gal-Or (1993) on
strategic cost allocation. In this paper, it is demonstrated that the sharing rule
of overhead costs, selected by ￿ rms, depend upon pro￿ t as well as strategic
considerations.
The  session  was  concluded  with  a  review  of  a  paper  by  Wagenhofer
(1994) on transfer pricing under asymmetric information. More speci￿ cally,
the paper deals with agency models with pre-contracting information. It is
shown  that  even  in  a  very  simple  model  there  is  no  uniquely  preferable
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preferable to another. In order to keep the participants ‘entertained’ during
the evening, they were asked to solve a transfer pricing problem.
On Thursday, Wagenhofer ￿ rst discussed the transfer pricing exercise of
the  previous  day  and  then  turned  on  analytical  accounting  research  with
respect  to  ￿ nancial  accounting  issues.  The  ￿ rst  formal  session  dealt  with
accounting  principles  and  accounting  method  choice.  The  ￿ rst  question
tackled  was  the  choice  between  discretion  and  uniformity  (Dye  and
Verrecchia, 1995). In this paper several suf￿ cient conditions were identi￿ ed
that  ensure  the  superiority  of  expanding  discretion.  Wagenhofer  stressed
though that discretion is only useful because it has been audited (with known
probabilities), which is a very important assumption in the model.
Another ￿ nancial accounting issue which could be examined using agency
theory is income smoothing. In this respect, a paper by Lambert (1984) was
discussed. The paper is concerned with smoothing that arises due to incentive
problems.
As a ￿ nal issue in the accounting principles and accounting method choice
session, the LIFO/FIFO choice was discussed. As a research tool signalling
models  or  information  transfer  models  were  introduced.  In  this  respect,
reference was made to a paper by Hughes and Schwartz (1988) on the LIFO/
FIFO choice. Their model provides a justi￿ cation of why we may observe
some  ￿ rms  switching  to  LIFO,  all  ￿ rms  switching  to  LIFO,  or  all  ￿ rms
remaining  to  FIFO,  depending  on  the  magnitude  of  tax  bene￿ ts  and  the
proportion of good and bad ￿ rms. Wagenhofer stressed that in most of these
kind of cases you have multiple equilibria, both separate and pooling.
The  last  formal  session  of  Alfred  Wagenhofer  dealt  with  disclosure  of
proprietary  information.  In early models,  the  optimal  equilibrium  was full
disclosure. It appeared that the market forces disclosure because of rational
expectations. This is called the disclosure principle. However, this result of
full disclosure  doesn’t seem to  correspond  with practice. Indeed,  manage-
ment may have various reasons not to disclose their information. In a paper
by Dye (1985), three reasons were considered for management’s failure to
disclose  their  nonproprietary  information.  Nonproprietary  information  is
information about the ￿ rm whose release would affect the prices of that ￿ rm,
but not the distribution  of the ￿ rm’s future earnings.
Voluntary disclosure  models also need to take into account the costs of
voluntary  disclosure.  In  this  respect  reference  was  made  to  a  paper  by
Wagenhofer (1990) on voluntary disclosure with a strategic opponent.
As  a  ￿ nal  element  of  the  voluntary  disclosure  problem,  the  so-called
‘cheap talk’ issue was considered. ‘Cheap talk’ refers to a message which can
be communicated at no cost, but which is arbitrary as it cannot be veri￿ ed.
Gigler  (1994)  has  tackled  this  issue  in  his  paper,  entitled  ‘Self-enforcing
voluntary disclosures’. The afternoon session was concluded with an exercise
on ‘cheap talk’ equilibria out of Farrell and Gibbons (1989).
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the seminar. During  the  morning  session  Feltham discussed  the  impact of
public and private management information on investor welfare, prices, trading
volume and management incentives. Feltham pointed out that when examining
the role of regulation,  which affects all ￿ rms, you  need to turn to general
equilibrium analysis instead of partial equilibrium analysis. It could be seen as
a kind of social welfare analysis. In this respect, Feltham ￿ rst considered the
welfare implications of public information in ef￿ cient markets. Therefore, an
analysis  was  made  of  the  decision-facilitating  role  of  external  accounting
reports in large capital markets in which managers are costlessly motivated to
act in the best interests of investors. It was demonstrated that if those reports
provide a means of making better production decisions, they also appear to
provide a basis for Pareto improvements. In contrast, reports that reveal future
￿ rm speci￿ c windfall gains or losses do not seem to have value. They only
affect market prices. It was further shown that while resources will be allocated
more ef￿ ciently if managers have information about the productivity of their
￿ rms, the economy can achieve those ef￿ ciency gains without reporting ￿ rm
speci￿ c productivity information to investors. The latter holds if investors have
well-diversi￿ ed  investment  portfolios  and  are  aware  of  each  manager’s
information structure and decision criterion.
Feltham  then  turned  to  the  issue  of  investor  acquisition  of  private
information prior to a public report. In this respect, reference was made to a
paper by Kim and Verrecchia (1991). In this paper, it is shown that when the
quality of prior information increases, residual uncertainty will decrease as
well as the variance of price changes. Feltham pointed out that if one could
prevent  investors  from  acquiring  private  information,  everyone  would  be
better  off.  However,  no  one  trusts  another  which  results  in  the  so-called
‘shoot in your own foot’ phenomenon.
The  last  part  of  the  morning  session  dealt  with  market  prices  as
contractible proxies for private investor information. As earnings information
is  impounded  into  the  share  price,  the  question  arises  as  to  what  role
earnings, as a separate contracting  variable, can play in alleviating agency
problems.  Feltham  referred  in  this  respect  to  a  paper  by  Bushman  and
Indjejikian (1993). It appeared that if there is no private investor information,
then the market price is ignored and the optimal contract is based strictly on
the public report. Feltham pointed  out though  that comparative statics can
signi￿ cantly  be  in￿ uenced  by  whether  the  rational  investors’  private
information is exogenous or endogenous.
The afternoon session dealt with accounting data and market value. First of
all, the relation between market value and future accounting  numbers was
considered.  There  has  already  been  substantial  empirical  research  on  this
issue. However, theoretical fundamentals were lacking. This has led to a joint
working paper of Feltham and Ohlson (1996). The basis of this paper was
prior research published by Feltham (1996) and Feltham & Ohlson (1995).
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second paper demonstrates that, under certain assumptions, the value of equity
also equals the current book value of the equity plus the discounted value of
risk-adjusted expected abnormal earnings. However, the accounting for other
equity transactions, like convertible debts and stock warrants, can result in
accounting numbers that do not permit the general application of the account-
ing-value relation. In this respect, accounting procedures for the issuance of
equity were classi￿ ed as being ‘super-clean’, ‘contingently-clean’, or ‘dirty’.
Feltham then turned to a joint working paper with Ohlson (1996) in which
the basic theoretical structure of the valuation model is extended by eliminat-
ing restrictions on investors’ risk preferences and the behaviour of interest
rates.
The afternoon session was concluded with considering the relation between
market value and contemporaneous accounting numbers. Reference was made
to  another  joint  paper  of  Feltham  and  Ohlson  (1996),  in  which  certain
attributes of classical depreciation theory are extended to nonclassical settings.
Much of the analysis dealt with the identi￿ cation of a depreciation policy such
that the market value can be inferred from book value plus an adjustment for
the ￿ rm’s pro￿ tability as measured by abnormal earnings. It was stressed that
different models must be applied on the different components of abnormal
earnings, namely persistent and non-persistent abnormal earnings.
In the last session of the doctoral seminar on Saturday, Feltham dealt with
analytical accounting research in auditing. First of all, the role of audits and
audit quality in initial public offerings was considered. In his respect, reference
was made to a paper by Datar et al. (1991), in which a model is developed in
which audit reports are valuable to entrepreneurs who have private informa-
tion and seek to share risks with investors.
The auditing  session  was concluded  with a discussion  on the impact of
litigation on auditor incentives and value. Feltham referred to a paper by Chan
and Pae (1996) which examines the economic consequences  of alternative
legal environments.
By means of conclusion, I would like to thank the EIASM and the seminar
faculty for the opportunity that was given to us, doctoral students, to improve
our understanding  and skills for using analytical modelling  to tackle inter-
esting accounting questions.
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